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THE INDETERMINACY OF THE LAW:
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND THE
PROBLEM OF LEGAL EXPLANATION
Charles M. Yablon*
A central assertion of the Critical Legal Studies theorists is that
the law—or more specifically, the relationship between authoritative
doctrinal materials (like statutes, cases, etc.) and the actions of legal
decisionmakers—is loose or "indeterminate."' They reject the notion
that legal doctrine can ever compel determinate results, in a deductive
sense, in concrete cases.^ In so doing. Critical theorists seek to asso
ciate legal indeterminacy with the feeling, familiar to most law stu
dents and practicing lawyers, that doctrine can be utilized to argue
any side of any legal issue.^
This claim will strike a responsive chord in many practicing law
yers, particularly litigators, who are used to approaching doctrinal
materials, not as a coherent guide to permissible conduct, but as an
arsenal of weapons that can be used to justify virtually any position a
• Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A., 1972, Columbia
University; J.D., 1975, Yale University. I wish to thank William Bratton, David Carlson,
Steven Diamond, Arthur Jacobson, David Rudenstine, Katherine Stone, Suzanne Stone, Paul
Shupack, and David Trubek for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I am
also very grateful to Joseph Lamport for providing invaluable research assistance and excellent
philosophical discussions.
' See, e.g., Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 101 (1984); Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 580-81 (1982) [here
inafter cited as Kennedy, Paternalist Motives]; Tushnet, Post-Realist Scholarship, 15 J. Soc'y
Pub. Tchrs. L. 20, 21 (1980); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
561, 570-72 (1983).
2 See, e.g., Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 206 (1984) ("Legal doc
trine not only does not, but also cannot, generate determinant results in concrete cases.");
Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note 1, at 581; see also Heller, Structuralism and Cri
tique, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 191 (1984) (the contradictory strands of legal theory have only an
analogical and indeterminate bearing on legal practice).
3 For example, Roberto Unger observes:
It will always be possible to find, retrospectively, more or less convincing ways to
make a set of distinctions, or failures to distinguish, look credible. A common
experience testifies to this possibility; every thoughtful law student or lawyer has
had the disquieting sense of being able to argue too well or too easily for too many
conflicting solutions.
Unger, supra note 1, at 570. See also Gordon, supra note 1, at 116 (observing that lawyers and
Judges lay bare the contradictions of the legal system in their adversary arguments and
dissents).
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client wishes to maintain.'* The experienced advocate knows that the
doctrinal regime is sufficiently complex that there will always be some
set of authoritative materials which, through skillful manipulation of
the level of specificity and characterization of the facts, he can declare
to be "controlling" of the case at bar. Similarly, he can be confident
that no matter what authorities his opponent puts forward as equally
dispositive, he will be able to find a basis for distinguishing them.
This is not to imply that by skillfully manipulating doctrine, the advo
cate feels he is acting in bad faith or distorting the "true" meaning of
the case. On the contrary, there is sufficient identification between
lawyer and client, and sufficient indeterminacy in the meaning of the
doctrinal materials, that most advocates, by the time they finish writ
ing their briefs, are convinced of the correctness of their clients'
positions.'
However, this perception—that every case can be argued both
ways within the doctrinal system—appears to be inconsistent with an
other equally familiar phenomenon. Lawyers can, and often do, "de
termine," in the sense of "predict," the results of concrete cases, and
they do so largely through an analysis and application of doctrinal
principles. Every time a lawyer advises a client that one course of
action entails less legal risk than another, or tells one client she has a
case while advising another he doesn't, that lawyer is predicting, often
with a high degree of success, the probable result of a concrete case.
Indeed, much of what lawyers sell is their ability to predict the re
sponses of legal institutions based (at least in part) on their ability to
analyze doctrinal materials.^
See Heller, supra note 2, at 186 n.97 (litigation's role in upsetting settled legal practice
may explain why litigators have been subject to a "certain ostracism . . . within the
profession").
5 See J. Freund, Lawyering 214-15 (1979). As Freund explains;
[The] hallmark of the effective advocate is his belief in the lightness of his
cause. . . .
. . . And before he can set out to persuade others to agree, the first person to
convince is himself. However skeptically the litigator begins, by the time he's ar
guing the case in court, his belief is total and absolutely sincere.
Id. This identification by the advocate with the cause being advocated sometimes resonates
with religiosity. See, e.g., S. Quindry, Practicing Law 240-41 (1938) (complete fidelity to a
client's cause and a genuine desire for justice are essential parts of a lawyer's creed, which
"cause the lawyer to submerge self and exalt the cause he represents"); L.P. Stryker, The Art
of Advocacy 272 (1954) ("With all my heart I believed that my client had not sinned, but if he
had, I knew he had a far, far better advocate than 1. If such an advocate would plead for him,
who was I to decline?").
® A substantial body of scholarly literature on "bargaining in the shadow of the law"
suggests that lawyers and clients consider legal results sufficiently predictable to enable an ex
ante calculation of the value of claims, thereby fostering an informal settlement. See, e.g., H.
Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustments 220-22
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Thus, any coherent analysis of what it means for the law to be
indeterminate must take into account both the practicing lawyer's in
tuition that every case can be argued both ways and the seemingly
contradictory intuition that legal results are predictable or, as ex
pressed by Cardozo, that in 90% of all cases judicial results can be
anticipated by "right-minded men.'"
The obvious compromise position, which many mainstream
scholars adopt, is to postulate a core of "easy cases" that are "predict
able," surrounded by a penumbra of "hard cases" where doctrine is
indeed indeterminate and outcomes are therefore unpredictable.®
Such a position reduces the claim of legal indeterminacy to a quasiempirical matter of degree. Moreover, it does not capture the sense,
which lawyers often have, that the same case may be both indetermi
nate and predictable at the same time. It is generally quite easy for
lawyers to generate an argument that makes perfect "sense" within
the existing doctrinal structure, but which one can predict, with vir
tual certainty, will not be adopted by any real judge.'
The Critical claim that the law is indeterminate need not, and
should not be viewed merely as a dispute about the extent to which
law is predictable. Indeed, such a claim need not at all deny the exist
ence of predictive, or even causal relationships between legal doctrine
and concrete legal results. Rather, the Critical claim of legal indeter
minacy may be understood as a declaration that doctrine can never be
(1970); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev.
4, 32 (1983) (The small fraction of all disputes adjudicated "provides a background of norms
and procedures against which negotiation . . . takes place."); Mnookin & Komhauser, Bar
gaining in the Shadow of the Law; The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979)
(suggesting that the legal rules of family law "give each parent certain claims based on what
each would get if the case went to trial").
'' Cardozo's actual point is slightly different as he sought to identify the basis for judgemade law in the absence of binding precedent. The full quotation is: "The feeling is that nine
times out of ten, if not oftener, the conduct of right-minded men would not have been different
if the rule embodied in the [judge's] decision had been announced by statute in advance." B.
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 143 (1921). Although implicit in this statement is
an assumption about the predictability of judicial decisions, it is worth noting that it derives
from the intuitions of "right-minded men" and not doctrinal rules.
8 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (1975) ("But if the case at hand
is a hard case, when no settled rule dictates a decision either way, then it might seem that a
proper decision could be generated by either policy or principle."). But see Heller, supra note
2, at 173-74 n.81.
' See Deutsch, Perlman v. Feldmann: A Case Study in Contemporary Corporate Legal
History, 8 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1 (1974) (distinguishing Perlman v. Feldmann from Vietnam-era
corporate law cases on the basis of the distinction between justifiable and nonjustifiable wars);
see also Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 22-23
(1984) (setting forth an argument that the fourteenth amendment requires socialism).
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an adequate explanation of legal results—a claim with profound im
plications, particularly with respect to legal scholarship.
This Article suggests that the problem of legal explanation re
vealed by the Critical theorists can be understood as a particular man
ifestation of the general problem of historical explanation and that
work by philosophers of history can be useful in analyzing this prob
lem. It argues that the inadequacy of doctrinal explanation leads to
the emphasis in Critical theory on the motivations of decisionmakers
and the explanation of legal results in terms of underlying social and
political structures. Moreover, these Critical assertions about legal
explanation are generally not subject to proof or refutation in an em
pirical sense, but are established to the extent that they have altered
the questions legal scholars feel compelled to answer about the law.
This Article sets forth and defends the preceding claims through
a philosophical account of the Critical concept of legal indeterminacy.
It does not seek to analyze or review the written work of any particu
lar theorist, far less, to give a coherent and exhaustive picture of
something called "Critical Legal Theory." The impossibility of pro
viding such an account has already been noted by people more capa
ble of accomplishing that task.'° Rather, by focusing on and
analyzing the concepts of indeterminacy, causation, and explanation,
this Article tries to make explicit what I believe is implicit in much of
the writing of Critical theorists. Its goal, then, is to set forth a philo
sophically defensible account of what it means for the law to be inde
terminate which comports with some, but certainly not all, of the
main aspects of Critical theory."
Part I of this Article makes some preliminary distinctions be
tween prediction and causation and seeks to show how the law can be
indeterminate and predictable at the same time. Part II analyzes the
problem of legal explanation as a subset of historical explanation and
sets forth what I take to be the Critical position that doctrinal expla
nations of law are never adequate. Part III shows how the Critical
10 See Linger, supra note 1, at 563-64 n. 1; see also Heller, supra note 2, at 128 n.4 (sug
gesting a structuralist explanation for the Critical scholars' denial of a group ideology because
"the privilege of ideological coherence is . . . ironically conferred in the gaze of others").
11 The subject of this Article is the indeterminacy critique, not the Critical Legal Studies
movement itself. It does not deal, except in tangential ways, with transformative politics or the
relationship of that critique with the development of a left political agenda—issues which may
be of central importance to the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g., Hutchinson &
Monahan, supra note 2, at 213. Moreover, this Article is unapologetically "rationalist" in that
it presumes the value of rational discourse and clarity of terms in achieving common under
standing, although the concept of rationality has been criticized by some as part of the "ration
alist, formulaic, positivist, yuk program." Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 4-5 (1984).
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concern with legal explanation leads to concerns about motivation
and explanation through social and political structures of thought.
Part IV looks at the epistemological status of the Critical claim that
the law is indeterminate and demonstrates that, while it is not subject
to empirical verification, that claim is, in a sense, already established.
I.

DETERMINACY, PREDICTION, AND CAUSATION
A.

Determinacy as Prediction

The existence, in some cases, of doctrinally predictable results
does not imply the existence of any causal or necessary relationship
between legal doctrine and concrete results. The existence of X may
be a valid predictor of the existence of Y, yet this does not imply that
X is a necessary condition of Y in either a logical or empirical sense.
For example, it is likely that the total rainfall for the United States
does not vary much from year to year. If so, the total rainfall for 1984
can be used to predict the amount of rain that will fall in 1985. Yet it
would be absurd to claim that the 1984 total caused the 1985 rainfall
or that the 1984 total was a necessary condition for the amount that
fell in 1985.
Similarly, Critical theorists might argue it would be quite sur
prising if doctrinal materials (which consist, after all, largely of results
reached by legal decisionmakers in prior disputes) were not useful in
predicting how future decisionmakers, who are likely to be either the
same individuals or similar types of people, will react to similar dis
putes in the future. But this in no way implies that there is any neces
sary relationship between the doctrinal formulations contained in
those materials and the results of concrete cases.
Indeed, I suspect that lawyers who use doctrinal materials to pre
dict results in concrete cases read and evaluate them in very different
ways from students or scholars seeking to derive "correct" doctrinal
formulations. For example, we are taught that there is a hierarchy of
doctrinal authority in which Supreme Court cases come first, courts
of appeals cases second, and so on. In trying to predict a federal dis
trict court decision, however, my own hierarchy would probably be:
recent decisions by that district court judge, first; recent decisions of
the court of appeals likely to review the case, second; recent decisions
of other district court judges my judge is likely to know, third; and
Supreme Court decisions, perhaps fourth.
This point is similar to William Dray's distinction between X as a reliable inductive sign
of Y, and X as the explanation of Y. See W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History 61
(1979).
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This distinction between prediction and causation leads to the
observation that there is no necessary connection between the formal
realizability of a set of legal rules and the predictability of legal re
sults. This observation, while hardly new,'^ is often obscured or ig
nored in much current scholarship where one finds an assumption
that a more formal, clear or consistent set of legal rules automatically
leads to greater "certainty" of result—that is, greater predictability.'*
In fact, as we have seen, there is no necessary connection between the
formal realizability of a set of legal rules and the predictability of re
sults. As Cardozo noted, a group of "right thinking men" with no
statutes (or established doctrinal rules) may still be able to predict the
results of equally "right thinking" jurists most of the time." More
over, as a practical matter, if we live in a legal regime which is both
formally indeterminate (since doctrinal arguments can always be in
voked on both sides) and predictable, no assumptions can be made as
to whether adoption of more or less formal legal rules will lead to
more or less certainty of prediction in such a legal regime.'®
B.

Determinacy as Causation

Once it is recognized that predictive statements about legal re'3 For example, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, John Dewey observed:
Enormous confusion has resulted, however, from confusion of theoretical certainty
and practical certainty. There is a wide gap separating the reasonable proposition
that judicial decisions should possess the maximum possible regularity in order to
enable persons in planning their conduct to foresee the legal import of their acts,
and the absurd because impossible proposition that every decision should flow
with formal logical necessity from antecedently known premises.
Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell L.Q. 17, 25 (1924).
See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 Yale L.J.
1354, 1376 (1978) (proposing a new classification for analyzing corporate freezeouts in the
expectation of a "material improvement both in the outcomes of litigated cases and in the
capacity of company managers ... to forestall litigation"); Yablon, Contention Disclosure
and Corporate Takeovers, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 429, 459-61 (1985) (suggesting four factors that
should be considered by a court evaluating corporate disclosure standards, for the purpose of
providing "a structure in which courts and lawyers can analyze the relevant considerations,"
id. at 461). The point, of course, is not that greater formal realizability will never lead to
greater predictability, but rather that the correlation can never be simply assumed. For a
discussion of how an increase in formal realizability leads to less predictability in welfare cases,
see Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 Yale L.J. 1198,
1221-22 (1983).
'' See supra note 7.
See Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance, 6 Cardozo L.
Rev. 947, 961-62 (1985) (systemic or general formally realizable rules can introduce standard
like concepts into legal analysis that increase the opportunities for judicial discretion and
thereby decrease predictability). Certainly, no assumption can be made without knowing a
great deal about those who will be applying the rules and those to whom the rules will be
applied. See Simon, supra note 14, at 1226.
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suits can be made without necessarily believing that such results are
caused by the existence of clear and knowable existing rules, a ques
tion arises: What is it that Critical theorists are denying when they
deny any determinate relationship between doctrinal rules and legal
results? Since Hume, it has generally been understood that the asser
tion of a causal relationship between two events or conditions does
not imply any logical necessity or the existence of any unobserved
power in the first event to bring about the latter; rather, that state
ment asserts an invariable conjunction between the occurrence of the
first and second event.'' To assert that X is the cause of Y is to assert
that X is invariably followed by Y, or, stated another way, X is the set
of all necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of Y.'®
In practice, this concept of causation, which Mill refers to as the
"philosophical" concept of causation," is primarily applied in the ex
perimental sciences. There, events can be sufficiently controlled and
generalized so as to create a limited and manipulable set of such con
ditions. For example, the statement "the volume of a gas is deter
mined by its temperature and pressure" uses "determined" in this
rigorous sense of philosophical causation.
However, when this concept of causation is applied to particular" D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 61-81 (1927). Hume de
fined cause as objects in succession of one another, where objects similar to the first object are
invariably followed by objects similar to the second object. Id. at 79.
1 J.S. Mill, System of Logic, bk. Ill, ch. V, §§ 1-5 (6th ed. London 1865) (1st ed.
London 1843). A cause, in Mill's view, "is the sum total of the conditions . . . the whole of
the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably fol
lows." Id. § 3, at 372. Mill did not restrict his discussion of causation to discrete, isolatable
phenomena. The prototypical event in Hume's causal analysis is the collision of billiard balls:
one event invariably follows another. See D. Hume, supra note 17, at 28. But Mill acknowl
edged that in the real world only quite rarely is there a single antecedent cause for a given
event. More often events in nature are the result of complicated clusters of events, including
both positive and negative conditions. J.S. Mill, supra § 3, at 367-71.
This redefinition of causality has led some commentators to suggest that Mill embraced
the doctrine of the plurality of causes. See H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, Causation in the Law
17-20 (1959). For Mill, any given event may be caused by several conditions and, therefore,
these conditions must be sufficient to cause the event. However, they are not the necessary
cause of the event, in the sense of being the exclusive cause. See id. at 18.
" 1 J.S. Mill, supra note 18, § 3. Mill's rigorous philosophical definition of cause requires
identification of all "conditions, positive and negative taken together." Id. at 372. But Mill
distinguished this rigorous definition of cause from the common usage of the word which
typically identifies a single event as the cause. The common usage, according to Mill, is im
proper for scientific discourse. Id. at 370. See also R. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics
285-327 (1972), in which Collingwood identified three senses of the word cause: the first asso
ciated with historical or common usage, admits of a possible multiplicity of causes; the second,
associated with the practical sciences, identifies a single cause against a background of mani
fold, necessary conditions; and the third, associated with the pure sciences, corresponds with
Mill's philosophically rigorous, unconditioned cause that encompasses all background condi
tions. Id. at 301-02.
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ized historical events, such as the making of a judicial ruling, it ceases
to be useful as a practical matter, and perhaps even as a theoretical
one. If, to state the "cause" of a judicial ruling, one must delineate all
the necessary and sufficient conditions leading to that ruling, the im
possibility of the undertaking is obvious. While the existence and ap
prehension by the judge of various doctrinal materials might well be
one of the background conditions of the ruling, there are numerous
others including the identity of the judge, her personality, her legal
training, her law clerk, the lawyers, their preparation, their training,
on ad infinitum.
Even if one agrees that doctrine may be one of the numerous
background conditions involved in "causing" a judicial result, the
very complexity of the decisionmaking process ensures that there can
never be any necessary connection between a particular doctrinal de
velopment and a concrete act of judicial decisionmaking. This is what
the Critical theorists mean when they speak of the "contingency" of
the relationship between doctrine and results.^" Given the large
number of potentially applicable doctrinal formulations (every case
can be argued at least two ways) and the large number of other back
ground conditions. Critical theorists can confidently take the strong
position that there can never be a necessary connection between any
doctrinal formulation and a given result.^' In every case, if the other
background conditions were sufficiently different, a different result
would apply.^^
20 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 1, at 101 ("The causal relations between changes in legal
and social forms are likewise radically underdetermined: Comparable social conditions . . .
have generated contrary legal responses, and comparable legal forms have produced contrary
social effects."); Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 2, at 206 ("Legal doctrine is nothing
more than a sophisticated vocabulary and repertoire of manipulative techniques for catego
rizing, describing, organizing, and comparing; it is not a methodology for reaching substantive
outcomes.").
21 On one level, indeterminacy is manifest in legal doctrine as evidenced by contradictory
impulses within supposedly coherent doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. On
another level, it has been argued, indeterminacy is emb^ded in language itself, or in the struc
ture of thought underlying language. See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory
and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 695 (1985), in which the author states:
There is no objective translation of social phenomena to legal phenomena, no neu
tral interpretation of unambiguous doctrine. At each stage of the legal process a
subjective and essentially political act of interpretation is required. This political
choice is involved in the wording of rules, in the construction and maintenance of
the "legal world" . . . .
22 This is the point Robert Gordon makes:
The Critical claim of indeterminacy is simply that none of these regularities are
necessary consequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules. The rule-system
could also have generated a different set of stabilizing conventions leading to ex
actly the opposite results and may, upon a shift in the direction of political winds,
switch to those opposing conventions at any time.
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According to this view, the assertion that law is indeterminate
reduces to the claim that the relation of legal doctrine to results is
extremely complex and probably never fully understood. While this
is a view many Critical theorists hold, such an observation does not
appear particularly disturbing to any lawyer or legal scholar who has
spent time studying or practicing in a given field of law. The full
implications of this view only appear in connection with the problem
of explaining the actions of judges or other legal decisionmalcers, an
activity in which many legal scholars purp>ort to be engaged.
II.

INDETERMINACY AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPLANATION
A.

The Problem of Historical Explanation

Explanation, in its most rigorous form, involves a statement
about the event sought to be explained and the assertion of a causal
(that is, invariable) generalization that if an event of the first type
occurs, an event of the second type will also occur. For example, one
can "explain" why the lake froze on December 30 by stating that:
(1) the lake contained 10,000 gallons of water; and (2) the tempera
ture had been below 25'F for five days. Implicit in this explanation is
the causal generalization: If 10,000 gallons of water are subjected to
temperatures below 25°F for five days, that volume of water will
freeze. Note that this causal generalization is of Mill's philosophical
type in that it sets forth the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
freezing of the lake.^^
Most explanations of historical events, however, set forth only a
small fraction of the background conditions that "caused" the event
in Mill's philosophical sense of causation. For example, one might
explain Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 by referring to a host of
events—the Iranian hostage situation, low voter turnout, a conserva
tive trend among the electorate—none of which were sufficient, in
themselves, to cause the election of Reagan, but all of which consti
tuted background conditions required for his election to occur in the
way it did. At the same time, however, one would probably ignore a
whole series of other conditions which, while equally necessary, in
that they were required to exist in order for Reagan's election to oc
cur, would not be considered very illuminating as explanations of that
Gordon, supra note 1, at 125.
According to Ernest Nagel, one characteristic of causal laws found in modem physical
sciences is that such laws assert "a relation of functional dependence . . . between two or more
variable magnitudes associated with stated properties or processes." E. Nagel, The Structure
of Science 77 (1961). The relation of functional dependence between temperature and quantity
of water is one example.
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event: that the United States is a democracy, that the Republican
party exists, that California is a state.
Thus, the problem of explanation with respect to complex histor
ical events is that they are "overdetermined":^'* there are a multitude
of events and conditions which jointly constitute the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of that event, and no identifi
able principle exists for selecting one or more of those conditions as a
more valid "explanation" of the event than any other.
Nevertheless, in a historical or common sense usage of the con
cept of explanation, it is clear that some background conditions are
"better" explanations of the event than others. For example, consider
the person, asked to explain the occurrence of a fire in a nearby build
ing, who replies that it occurred because there was oxygen in the air at
the time. Certainly the explanation is true in the sense that the pres
ence of oxygen was a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
the occurrence of a fire. This statement, however, would not gener
ally be considered a "good" or "adequate" explanation of the occur
rence of a particular fire. By contrast, the statement "a man in the
apartment building had been smoking in bed" would likely be consid
ered an adequate explanation.
A number of philosophers have attempted to develop some prin
ciple whereby explanatory conditions (often referred to, in this more
limited sense, as "causes") can be distinguished from mere back
ground conditions. Collingwood suggested that, as a matter of "prac
tical science," the distinguishing feature of explanatory conditions
was that they could be manipulated or used to obtain or prevent the
explained effect.^' For example, the explanation that my car is not
moving because sufficient energy is not being imparted to the rear
See Gordon, supra note 1, at 70-71. Gordon uses different terminology to make a simi
lar point. Critical scholarship, according to Gordon, attacks the assumption that social events
are "determined by impersonal social forces." Id. at 70. Instead, Gordon views social events
as overdetermined in the sense that "they are processes whose logic is one of multiplicity, not
uniformity of forms." Id. at 71.
25 R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 302-11. Collingwood formulated two principles from
his critique of Mill's discussion of causation. First, he argued, "for any given person the cause
. . . of a given thing is that one of its conditions which he is able to produce or prevent." Id.
at 304. This principle, rephrased as the relativity of causes, leads to the identification of multi
ple causes in the analysis of a common phenomenon. Collingwood put forward the example of
a car skid, which by this principle, can be said to be caused by the car's speed, the road's grade,
or the car's design, depending upon the analyst's vantage point and which factor is most under
the analyst's control. Id. As a corollary to this principle, Collingwood proposed that "for a
person who is not able to produce or prevent any of its conditions a given event has no cause
... at all." Id. at 306. See also Collingwood, On the So-Called Idea of Causation, in 38 Proc.
Aristotelian Soc'y 85, 85-90 (1938) (defining cause, in one sense, as the power to produce or
prevent an event at will).
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wheels to overcome inertial forces, while implying a true causal gener
alization, is unsatisfactory. The explanation that my car is not mov
ing because the battery is dead is much better.
Hart and Honore criticized this method of distinguishing explan
atory causes, pointing out that, according to it, we could not know the
cause of cancer, in this explanatory sense, if we could not prevent it."
They proposed instead a distinction between normal and abnormal
conditions, arguing that what distinguished the explanatory condition
was that it was unusual or out of the ordinary. For this reason, smok
ing in bed, since it constitutes a relatively unusual event, can be the
explanation for a fire, while the presence of oxygen cannot.^'
These philosophers also give special attention to the causal expla
nation of voluntary human acts. For Collingwood, all causal thinking
is built upon an anthropomorphic metaphor that refers to the experi
ence of compulsion in human affairs.^® Causation or compulsion in
human affairs, though, does not negate the idea of free will." Rather,
the explanatory cause of a voluntary action is the event that provides
an inducement or persuasion to that actor.^° Hart and Honore use
similar language to describe a causal connection between two human
actors. In order to preserve the concept of free will. Hart and Honore
stress that such causal statements do not imply any generalizable reg
ularity between reasons and voluntary acts.^' Instead, causal state26 H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, supra note 18, at 31. They further noted: "The discovery
of the cause of cancer would still be the discovery of the cause, even if it were useless for the
cure or avoidance of the disease. . . ." Id. at 34. Compare Collingwood s definition of cause,
supra note 25 and accompanying text. Hart and Honore conceded that there was much over
lap between their definition and Collingwood's; "What very often brings 'controllability' and
cause together is the fact that our motive in looking for the abnormality which 'makes the
difference' is most often the wish to control it and, through it, its sequel." Id. Hart and
Honore's definition is broader than Collingwood's, then, because it includes, within the cate
gory of causes, such uncontrollable events as droughts and lightning bolts. Id.
22 Id. at 31-36. But when oxygen is not normally present, as in a laboratory with a con
trolled atmosphere, the presence of oxygen can serve as the causal explanation of a fire. Id. at
33.
28 See R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 296-327. Causal thinking, in the first sense of the
word, describes the causes of voluntary human actions. Id. at 296. The second sense of the
word cause, as«v^'atw1 with the practical sciences, involves the idea of compulsion, which,
according to Collingwood, is based upon the experience of compulsion in man's social life. Id.
at 309. Thus, causal thinking in the practical sciences, which describes man's manipulation of
nature, resembles causal thinking about purely human actions. Id. at 310-11. Collingwood
claimed that even the third, purely scientific sense of cause is also based on the idea of compul
sion in human affairs. Id. at 322.
29 Id. at 293. Indeed, Collingwood indicated that causal thinking depends upon a belief in
free will: "The act so caused [in the first sense of the word] is still an act; it could not be done
(and therefore could not be caused) unless the agent did it of his own free will." Id.
30 Id. at 292-95.
31 H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, supra note 18, at 52 ("The statement that one person did
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ments, in their view, describe particularized "mental acts."^^
Yet the problem of overdetermination—that is, the existence of a
multitude of true and .necessary conditions for the occurrence of an
act—is present with voluntary acts, as well as other events. For ex
ample, my voluntary act of coming to school today may be explained
by the statements: "I came because I had a class today"; "I came
because I am a responsible person"; or "I came because I have recov
ered from the flu." All are true statements. All constitute reasons for
the same voluntary action. Indeed, in a rigorous sense, my action
may only be explained by the sum total of all such reasons. Yet some
of those individual reasons would be considered more adequate expla
nations than others. If the concept of a voluntary, choosing subject is
jettisoned, even more explanations become possible. Rather than ex
plaining my being at school as a result of my individual action, it then
becomes possible to analyze the concept of school and show that it is
dependent upon people like me being there.
One of the features of explanatory statements, which the preced
ing discussion illustrates, is that their adequacy depends, to a consid
erable extent, on the knowledge and assumptions of the person
seeking the explanation. Both Collingwood's "practical science"
view, which expressly relies on the questioner's ability to recreate or
prevent the effect,^'^ and Hart and Honore's normal/abnormal distinc
tion presuppose that explanatory causes may be different for different
questioners. Collingwood calls this the "relativity of causes."^' Hart
something because, for example, another threatened him, carries no implication or covert as
sertion that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would follow.")
32 Id. at 48-53. They explain: "One person can only be 'induced' to act by another if he
knows and understands what that other has said. In this sense the relationship between the
two actions in such cases is 'through the mind' of the second person." Id. at SO.
33 A common feature of structuralist analysis is a rejection of subjective consciousness as
an analytic category. See P. Petit, The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis 69
(1977) (suggesting that a common theme in the works of Althusser, Foucault, Lacan, and
Levi-Strauss is that "the conditions determine subjective consciousness to the extent that [it is]
self-understanding . . . presenting] subjective consciousness as 'false consciousness', a con
sciousness systematically beset by illusion about its own autonomy"); see also Heller, supra
note 2, at 148-51 ("The subject is denaturalized because it recognizes its own mediation
through structure. It rejects the sense that it has an ontologically given existence, perceiving
itself instead as a social artifact with a discursively given constitution." Id. at 148); D. Trubek,
TAKING RIGHTS LIGHTLY?: Radical Voices in American Legal Theory 21 (unpublished
manuscript based on remarks made at The New School for Social Research & Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law Lecture in Law and Social Theory, Nov. 19, 1984) (available in Benja
min N. Cardozo School of Law Library) ("There are, in fact, no such things as 'individuals' in
the liberal sense, since all of us are constructed by the institutions we are engaged in and by the
language we speak.").
3* R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 296-97.
35 Id. at 304-07.
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and Honore illustrate it by describing two different explanations of a
case of indigestion. To the wife of the man with indigestion, the cause
is the parsnips he ate the night before. To the man's doctor, it is the
ulcerated condition of his stomach lining. Hart and Honore note that
it is the questioners' different assumptions about what is normal and
abnormal that lead to this difference in explanatory causes.^®
It is not necessary, for purposes of this argument, to decide
whether either Hart or Collingwo^ have provided a satisfactory cri
terion for distinguishing explanatory causes from background condi
tions. Rather, it is simply necessary to note (as they both do) that the
questioner's own assumptions play a large role in determining the ad
equacy of any explanatory response.
Such assumptions may be blatantly instrumental. For example,
the questioner who wants to know why his car won't go will be satis
fied only with the explanation which enables him to fix it. Yet this is
just an example of the broader point—that the adequacy of any ex
planatory response is determined contextually. Individuals in differ
ing societal roles will explain the same phenomenon differently. The
birth of a child with a birth defect may be explained by a doctor as a
result of chromosome damage, by a lawyer as the result of a negligent
failure to perform amniocentesis, and by a priest as an act of divine
will. Thus, the form and adequacy of an explanatory statement is
dependent on the discipline of which that statement is a part. With
this in mind, we can reconsider the Critical concept of indeterminacy
in connection with the problem of legal explanation.
B.

Indeterminacy and the Problem of Legal Explanation

The problem of explaining legal decisions is a particular instance
of the general problem of historical explanation. Judicial decisions
(and, for that matter, all other governmental actions taken pursuant
to "legal" processes) are historical events and are overdetermined.
Thus, they may be explained by a set of innumerable background con
ditions, in the same way as other historical events.'' A potentially
infinite number of "reasons" exist—that is, a potentially infinite
number of background conditions can be cited—all of which are nec
essary for the judge to have taken precisely the action that she did.
This observation, combined with the Critical insight that doctri
nal argument can be invoked in support of any judicial result, leads to
what I believe to be one of the central Critical claims of indetermiH.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, supra note 18, at 33-34.
See Gordon, supra note 1, at 75-81. Gordon maintains that "statements of regularity in
legal-social relations don't stand up very well to historical criticism." Id. at 75.
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nacy: legal results can never be adequately explained by doctrinal
materials.
In this view, it is not a satisfactory explanation of a judge's dis
missal of a contract action to say she did so "because she applied the
Parol Evidence Rule." We know (because doctrinal argument can be
invoked in support of any judicial result) that if the case had not been
dismissed, it would be possible to explain that result "because the
agreement was not integrated" or "because the agreement contained
ambiguous terms."
None of these proffered reasons are "false" in the sense that they
had nothing to do with the judge's decision. They may even be the
"reasons" that floated to the surface of her mind as she wrote the
opinion. But to the Critical theorists, they are no more adequate than
the explanation that the fire started because of the presence of oxygen
in the air. Just as the investigator of a fire knows that he will find
oxygen at the site, the investigator of judicial decisions knows that he
will find doctrinal justifications. In neither case does that fact illumi
nate why this particular judicial event occurred and not some other.
So far, the argument appears to refute only the most extreme
kind of formalism. It might be argued that extreme formalists are the
only ones who would invoke the Parol Evidence Rule to explain the
dismissal of a contract action. The more sophisticated mainstream
theorist would explain the invocation of that doctrine by reference to
the policies and principles that are presumed to underlie it. Thus, a
standard form of legal explanation these days might well be that the
contract action was dismissed to encourage careful drafting or to
avoid potential fraud by requiring contracting parties to set forth the
entirety of their agreement in a writing.
Yet the Critical theorists perceive that arguments from principles
and policies, like doctrinal arguments, are infinitely malleable. In
deed, they perceive such arguments as merely another form of doctri
nal justification: one in which every potentially relevant doctrinal
position has as its epigone a set of policy or principle justifications
which can be invoked as mechanically in support of any side of the
argument as can the underlying doctrine.^®
Thus, the principle of not penalizing contracting parties for the
drafting failures of their lawyers can be invoked as the counterpolicy
to the application of the Parol Evidence Rule. The infinite malleabil
ity of such policies and principles is at least as familiar to most law
See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276,
1292-93 (1984); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685, 1722-24, 1731-37 (1976).
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professors as the manipulation of doctrine is to practicing advocates.
Indeed, it is not at all unusual anymore to find such policy arguments
being made directly to judges, as practicing lawyers find that they too
can be used to argue any side of an issue.
To the Critical theorists, invocations of such disembodied policy
formulations to explain concrete decisions are as unsatisfactory as
doctrinal formulations, because they are equally indeterminate. In
deed, it is the indeterminacy of such forms of argument which leads
Unger to lump them with strict doctrinal arguments as simply an
other version of "formalism."''
Thus, implicit in the Critical assertion of legal indeterminacy is
an attack on the adequacy of legal explanation through doctrine.
Moreover, by recognizing that such indeterminacy is characteristic,
not only of strict doctrinal argument, but of policy argument as well,
a similar attack can be made against policy arguments as inadequate
to explain legal results. Pointing out the doctrinal or policy bases of a
decision—like pointing out the presence of oxygen in a room which
has been set afire—may be an accurate description of a necessary con
dition, but does not tell us anything we want to know about the event.
III.

EXPLANATION THROUGH MOTIVATION AND
STRUCTURE OF THOUGHT
A.

Motivation

If doctrines and policies cannot explain judicial results, what
can? It is in the attempt to answer this question that some of the
familiar outlines of Critical theory become apparent.
Since Critical theorists are well aware that doctrines and policies
exist to justify any legal result, the decisionmaker's choice of any par
ticular doctrine becomes the fundamental event that requires explana
tion. This is true even if the decisionmaker believes herself to be
constrained by doctrinal rules and does not recognize that she has
made such a choice at all. If the judge believes herself constrained by
the Parol Evidence Rule, it is the source of that belief which requires
explanation. That explanation cannot be provided by the Parol Evi
dence Rule itself, but may perhaps be provided by an analysis of her
attitude toward the Rule—her motive in concluding that that rule was
applicable, and not some other. Thus, the Critical theorists' aware
ness of legal indeterminacy leads them to seek explanations not in
doctrines or policies, but in the motivations connected with a particuUnger, supra note 1, at 570-73.
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lar policy or doctrinal choice, and leads to their concern with the rela
tionship between motivations and legal doctrine.
Consider then three possible explanations of a result which refer
to the judge's motivation in applying the Parol Evidence Rule:
(1) She decided, based on her personal experience and sympa
thies, that the defendant deserved to win, and she used the Parol
Evidence Rule as a convenient justification for that previously deter
mined result;
(2) She believes that the sole purpose of law is to maximize the
efficient use of goods and services in society and, after a careful read
ing of the law and economics theorists, she determined that an unwa
vering application of the Parol Evidence Rule in all cases would help
achieve that goal by minimizing ambiguity in contracts, and thereby
reducing transaction costs;
(3) She conceives of society as composed of autonomous indi
viduals acting to benefit themselves at the expense of others, only
grudgingly seeking mutual benefit by expansion of their obligations to
each other through contract. Since she perceives most human rela
tionships—or at least business relationships—as taking this form, she
believes that the application of a rule that prevents enforcement of
obligations not expressly delineated in the contract is "right" and
"appropriate."
The first explanation assumes that doctrinal materials play no
part at all in the selection of legal results. The offeror of such an
explanation agrees with the view that doctrine cannot produce deter
minate results but goes further and denies the possibility of any rela
tionship between doctrine and legal results other than a post hoc
hypocritical one. Such a view locates the motivations of legal deci
sionmaking solely in the decisionmaker's personal beliefs, prejudices,
and sympathies. On this view, doctrine is merely a useful method of
putting a false patina of objectivity on the enactment of judicial
prejudices and sympathies.
This view, which may be found in varying degrees among the
Legal Realists,^ implies that any systematic study of doctrine is likely
to be of little value. The sources and explanations of judicial value
choices (if they can be found at all) will be found in the study of how
^ See, e.g., J. Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 111 (1930), wherein the author states;
The peculiar traits, disposition, biases and habits of the particular judge will,
then, often determine what he decides to be the law. In this respect judges do not
differ from other mortals; Tn every case of actual thinking,' says F.C.S. Schiller,
'the whole of a man's personality enters into and colors it in every part.' To know
the judge's hunch-producers which make the law we must know thoroughly that
complicated congeries we loosely call the judge's personality.
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judicial sympathies and prejudices are formed—matters on which the
social sciences may shed light—^but not in the analysis of doctrine.'*'
The second explanation app>ears to provide precisely the kind of
determinate explanation of legal results the Critical theorists believe
cannot be provided by doctrinal or policy justifications. A single and
universalizable societal goal is posited (i.e., efficiency) which is pre
sumed to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the choice of any
particular rule. All that remains is to perform a calculus of rules to
determine which doctrinal rule, or set thereof, can best achieve that
goal. Assuming that the persons seeking and providing the explana
tion share the view (which is assumed, but never demonstrated) that
efficiency is indeed the only legitimate basis for choosing one doctrinal
formulation over another, explanations of rule choices as efficiency
maximizing do indeed "explain" the choice of one rule over another.
The Critical attack on law and economics is not with respect to
the theoretical form of such arguments, which purport to provide a
determinate motivation for rule selection. Rather, the Critical attack
is based on: (1) the lack of any justification for positing efficiency as
the sole "metaprinciple" or basis for rule selection; and (2) their dem
onstration that the efficiency calculus is invariably corrupted by ad
hoc factual assumptions usually derived from our market economy or
our particular legal regime.*^ Thus, while law and economics appears
to provide a determinate model of rule selection that can explain par
ticular rule choices on the basis of efficiency, any attempt to explain
particular decisions according to such a model requires reference to
malleable and unverifiable factual assumptions that quickly render
such explanations as indeterminate as other forms of policy
justifications.
See K. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 100 (1962) ("I have
spoken of a new approach [in Legal Realism] to law as a social science, as a matter of behavior
to be seen, recorded, and studied . . .
see also Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 3S Colum. L. Rev. 809, 822 (1935) (describing Legal Realism's method
as "an assault upon all dogmas and devices that cannot be translated into terms of actual
experience").
See, e.g., Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note I, at 597-604; Kennedy &
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711, 714 (1980) ("The
result of this exercise, we believe, is to show convincingly, if nonrigorously, that any argument
for the economic virtue ('efficiency') of any legal rule must depend on specific assumptions
about the actual wants and factual circumstances of the persons affected by the choice among
possible rules . . . ."); see also linger, supra note 1, at 574 ("Asa result, an analytic apparatus
intended ... to be entirely free of restrictive assumptions about the workings of society and
entirely subsidiary to an empirical or normative theory that needs independent justification
gets mistaken for a particular empirical and normative vision.").
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Structures of Thought

The third explanation—^which I take to be in the form of a Criti
cal explanation of legal decisionmaking—differs from the first two ex
planations in that it does not view judicial motivation as separate
from, and extraneous to, the structure of the doctrinal rule itself.
Rather, it views judicial motivation as the result of structures of
thought that are at least partially constituted by the doctrinal rule.
Accordingly, there is a determinate linkage between the doctrinal rule
and the mode of social interaction and normative assumptions embod
ied in the rule.
This linkage is an outgrowth of the method of Critical theorists,
who extensively analyze doctrinal material in order to understand the
structures of thought that underlie the statement and justification of
legal rules.^^ Any statement of doctrinal rules—indeed, any state
ment justifying such rules—^must be phrased in language about soci
ety and the "preexisting" social structure. It may also reflect various
normative judgments about the social structure. Such background
structures are implicit in, and needed to "make sense" of, the doctri
nal rules.
For example, when Duncan Kennedy asserts that "[t]he rhetoric
of unequal bargaining power is distributionist in that it asserts the
desirability of intervention in favor of . . . weaker part[ies] in situa
tions where there is nothing like common law fraud, duress or inca
pacity,"^ he is finding, implicit in the language used by judges to
justify compulsory contract terms, an underlying normative vision of
the structure of society—a vision in which government may properly
intervene in favor of those who are relatively weak.
Such a vision is not merely posited—as efficiency is posited as an
overarching value by law and economics theorists—^but rather is de
veloped as an outgrowth of a particular doctrinal rule the Critical
theorist seeks to explain. In this sense. Critical theory is quite differ
ent from Legal Realism. It also explains why the Critical theorists,
despite their assertion that doctrinal argument is indeterminate, con
sider doctrine worthy of serious study One can find in some Realist
thought a rejection of any link between doctrine and motives for judi43 See, e.g., Casebeer, Teaching An Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will
Employment Revisited, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 765 (1985).
44 Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note 1, at 615.
43 See Bratton, Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapolitics and Kennedy's Form and Sub
stance, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 871 (1985), for a detailed comparison of Critical and more tradi
tional forms of doctrinal analysis.
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cial action.^ The Critical theorists believe there is a necessary link
and, indeed, that important general statements about the nature of the
legal regime may only be derived from the study of doctrine.
When the Critical theorist develops such structures of thought
from the language of doctrinal materi^s, he is not asserting that he
has found the single and true "cause" of that judicial decision.
Rather, he is asserting, I believe, that understanding the underlying
structure of thought is necessary to understand the judicial rule
choice, in much the same way that calculus is necessary to understand
physics, or knowledge of Jackson Pollack's work is necessary to un
derstand that of Roy Lichtenstein."*'
The Critical theorist would not, I believe, insist that deci
sionmakers necessarily have such structures "in mind" when making
rule choices (although that might be the case), but he would insist
that such structures are implicit in every such rule choice. Thus, the
judge might not be aware, when she invokes the Parol Evidence Rule,
that she is instantiating a structure of social thought which views soci
ety as composed of autonomous individuals acting to maximize their
personal needs and desires and which views law as desirable only in
sofar as it permits private ordering between such individuals. In her
role as judge, she may have no need to refer to her underlying social
vision at all. Yet, in explaining and justifying her decision, she would
be likely to agree that this view of human relationships is implicit in,
and justifies, her choice of rule. The Critical theorist can therefore
claim—and I believe this is a central claim—that no legal decision can
be adequately explained without reference to the underlying social
and normative structures of thought which give meaning to the
decision.'*®
^ For example, Jerome Frank reasoned; "If the law consists of the decisions of the judges
and if those decisions are based on the judge's hunches, then the way in which the judge gets
his hunches is the key to the judicial process [and wjhatever produces the judge's hunches
makes the law." Frank, supra note 40, at 104. Frank acknowledged that "rules and principles
of law are one class of [hunch-producers]," id., and that doctrine helps the judge check up on
the propriety of his hunches, id. Yet, he believed that legal doctrine plays only a minor role in
shaping a judge's hunches, in comparison to "hidden factors in the inferences and opinions of
ordinary men" which are "multitudinous and complicated, depending often on peculiarly indi
vidual traits of the persons whose inferences and opinions are to be explained." Id. at 105-06.
A. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art 107-11
(1981). Danto suggested that Roy Lichtenstein's paintings about brushstrokes of the 1960's
can only be understood in reference to Abstract Impressionism of the 19S0's because they
"connoted a set of associations only available to those who had known about the dense artistic
controversies of the 1950's." Id. at 111.
See, e.g., Trubek, Where the Action Is; Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan.
L. Rev. 575, 591-95 (1984). Trubek states; "[T]he consciousness of any society rests on its set
of world views, on basic (and sometimes implicit) notions about what is natural, necessary.
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Two decisionmakers who would apply different doctrinal princi
ples to the same case are, in effect, seeking to instantiate different so
cial and moral visions.'*' Thus, the claim that law can only be
adequately explained through such social structures leads to the dec
laration by Roberto Unger and others that all legal arguments are
arguments over the nature of political and social activity.'®
Most of the Critical theorists, however, do not seek to replace the
search for "true" doctrine with the search for "true" social visions.
Since such structures are implicit in doctrinal rules, and there are a
multiplicity of potentially conflicting doctrinal rules, the expanded
study of doctrine will generate a multitude of conflicting visions of
human social interaction and the nature of society. Yet by locating
the level of conflict among such structures—that is, among differing
visions of the nature of society—the Critical theorists would maintain
that they have provided a better, more adequate account of the legal
regime.
IV.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE
ASSERTION OF INDETERMINACY

In the preceding sections I argued that the Critical assertion that
the law is indeterminate can best be understood as a statement that
legal results can never be adequately explained by doctrinal rules or
the principles and policies commonly used to justify such rules. I fur
ther suggested that this insight leads to a second important Critical
assertion: legal results can be adequately explained by reference to
social and political visions implicit in doctrinal rule choices.
This section will discuss whether these assertions are true or,
more specifically, the conditions which would determine their truth or
falsity. I reach the perhaps surprising conclusion that the Critical at
tack on doctrinal explanation is true largely by virtue of the fact that
Critical scholars are indeed making such an attack, and thereby ad
vancing a particular view of the goals of legal explanation. I similarly
argue that the Critical claim that law can be adequately explained
just, and desirable." Id. at 592. Thus, he describes legal consciousness as a subset of social
consciousness—the set of world views that gives meaning to the legal order. He explains:
"Taken most broadly, legal consciousness includes all the ideas about the nature, function, and
operation of law held by anyone in society at a given time." Id.
See, e.g., Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note 1, at 570, 620-21; Klare, Labor Law
as Ideology; Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J.
450, 451-52 (1981).
'o Unger states: "The starting point of our argument is the idea that every branch of doc
trine must rely tacitly if not explicitly upon some picture of the forms of human association
that are right and realistic in the areas of social life with which it deals." Unger, supra note 1,
at 570.
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through underlying social structures of thought also rests on an asser
tion, albeit a more problematic one, about the goals of legal
explanation.
The statements I have taken as central to the Critical position on
indeterminacy are not statements about the actions of decisionmakers,
but rather statements about the nature of legal explanations. They are
statements about the nature of understanding of the law by legal aca
demics and thus, have a somewhat diflFerent epistemological status
from either descriptive or normative statements about the law itself.
One ground for dismissing a class of explanatory statements as
inadequate is that the regularity asserted by such statements does not,
in fact, exist. Presumably, the rejection of astrological explanations of
events is based on the absence of any regularity between the configur
ation of the stars and the occurrence of events on earth. But explana
tory statements may assert perfectly valid regularities and yet be
inadequate as explanations. Statements such as "the fire was caused
by the presence of oxygen in the air" or "Reagan won the election
because he was more popular than Carter" are true statements, but
they are likely to be inadequate as explanations. Adequacy, in this
sense, is determined as much by the question as the answer.
Thus, determining the validity of the Critical theorists' claims is
primarily a matter of evaluating the appropriateness of their questions
about the legal rules. We have seen that the assertion that a form of
explanation is inadequate is an expression that it does not provide the
kind of information expected or provide the kind of understanding
that is sought by the questioner. Is there any way to evaluate such
expectations, and judge them appropriate or not?
Collingwood and Kuhn, writing from very different perspectives,
have both suggested that such evaluations can be made only within
the context of a particular "science" or intellectual enterprise. Col
lingwood suggests that certain types of explanations belong to certain
types of enterprises. For example, the person who explains my car's
inability to start by describing the inertial forces acting upon it may
be an excellent physicist, but a lousy mechanic." He is not asking the
right question—the question appropriate to a mechanic: "What is the
condition that I can change that will result in the car's starting?"
Similarly, the anthropologist who seeks to explain a tribe's ritual sac
rifice of pigs rather than goats by pointing out that the tribe's gods
had demanded pigs would not, we could say, be "doing" anthropol
ogy, but perhaps some sort of comparative theology. In such cases.
R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 302-03.
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the ability to evaluate the adequacy of the explanation for an event
rests on the purposes of the enterprise in which the parties are
engaged.
Kuhn, while not speaking specifically about the problem of
causal explanation, but about the way scientific enterprise is con
ducted, locates the source of the scientific enterprise in the shared
beliefs and values he calls a paradigm.
In admittedly circular fash
ion, he defines "paradigm" as certain shared beliefs and values held
by the scientific community.'^ He further argues that certain types of
scientific explanations constitute "exemplars" which form part of the
shared paradigm of that community. Accordingly, new scientific ex
planations may be evaluated on the basis of whether or not they re
semble (that is, refer to) the same type of explanatory causes as those
explanations which are "exemplars" of the shared paradigm.'^
Thus, both Kuhn and Collingwood recognize that an evaluation
of the adequacy of an explanatory statement can be made only by
reference to the goals of the discipline within which the explanation is
proposed. Each discipline provides goals of explanation that are dis
tinct from the questioner's subjective concerns. Their explanations
can be evaluated in light of those goals, thereby ameliorating the rela
tivity of causes. Thus, it is the very existence within a discipline of a
consensus as to its goals which permits the making of evaluations as
to the "adequacy" of particular explanations.^'
This does not mean, of course, that the truth of explanatory
statements is determined solely by the existence of such a consensus.
Rather, the recognition that an explanatory statement has been made
within a discipline enables one to utilize the criteria which exist
52 See T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 176 (2d ed. 1970).
53 Id. Kuhn's definition of paradigm is circular because, while he defines a paradigm as the
shared beliefs of a scientific community, at the same time, he defines a scientific community as
those who share a paradigm. Nonetheless, the idea of paradigm is a core concept in Kuhn's
work. Id. at 174-87.
54 An exemplar (or shared example, as Kuhn uses the term) is the type of knowledge em
bedded in the "concrete problem-solutions" of a scientific discipline. Id. at 187. An exemplar
includes laboratory, exam, and text book problems that are an integral part of the beginning
student's daily experience. Kuhn distinguishes between the type of knowledge contained in
scientific laws and the practical exercise of working through exemplars. Id. at 187-88.
55 Where a consensus as to the goals of a discipline is lost, an existing paradigm may cease
to function adequately. The most extreme case in which an older paradigm is replaced by an
incompatible, new one is that which occurs in a scientific revolution. As Kuhn explains: "Like
the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing [scientific] para
digms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life." Id. at 94. For a
further discussion of the nature and necessity of scientific revolutions and the ways in which
they change the world view, see generally id. at 92-135.
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within that discipline for determining the truth of such statements.'®
But the truth of the causal relationship implied by such statements is
logically distinct from their status as explanations within a given dis
cipline. The statement "the American Civil War was caused by Eng
lish secret agents" is a false statement, but it clearly belongs in the
genre of historical explanation, rather than that of science or
mechanics.
Of course, absolute consensus never exists in any discipline and a
reevaluation of the purpose of the enterprise is always open. It is at
this level that the Critical attack on the adequacy of doctrinal expla
nation carries real weight, because it carries with it certain assertions
about the nature and goals of the study of law. It asserts that the goal
of the study of law is to understand the value choices implicit in legal
decisionmaking. Since doctrinal rules exist to justify any such value
choice, explaining such value choices as "caus^" by doctrine, or by
principles or policies underlying the doctrine, can never provide an
adequate basis for understanding such value choices.
This claim can only be refuted in one of two ways. One can deny
the basic claim of indeterminacy, arguing that in some cases, only one
doctrinal rule is potentially applicable and reference to that rule can
therefore explain the value choice. We have seen, however, that this
requires more than merely showing that one can accurately predict
which of a number of potentially applicable doctrines will be applied.
Rather, it requires a showing that the contrary result cannot be justi
fied within the doctrinal system. Here the Critical theorists are in a
powerful alliance with the practicing bar. The very fact that opposing
lawyers are invariably able to ask courts or other decisionmakers for
directly contradictory results and have no trouble finding potentially
applicable doctrinal rules with which to fill their briefs is strong evi
dence for the Critical claim that doctrinal rules are indeterminate
and, therefore, cannot explain value choices.
The other basis for opposing the Critical scholars' position is to
attack their view of the goal of legal study. This requires denying that
the goal of legal study is the examination of societal value choices. If,
Raymond Aron made a similar point regarding the truth of historical statements. See
Aron, Relativism in History, in The Philosophy of History in Our Time 158 (H. Meyerhoffed.
1959). On the one hand, Aron argued that historical selection limits the validity of historical
argument to those who accept a given "system of reference." Id. However, on the other hand,
he stated: "[0]nce such a decisive, if not arbitrary, selection has been made, the subsequent
steps of the historian may well be rigorously scientific and claim to be universally valid." Id.
Somewhat similarly, Thomas Kuhn discussed how "proponents of competing [scientific] para
digms will often disagree about the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must
resolve." T.S. Kuhn, supra note 51, at 148.
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for example, the goal of legal study is to predict the results of future
appellate cases, doctrinal explanation may prove adequate. But, as
Collingwood and Kuhn have noted, the adequacy of a particular ex
planatory form must be evaluated within the context of a particular
intellectual discipline and with specific reference to whether it ad
vances the goals of that discipline. Such goals, however, are evi
denced by the shared beliefs and values among those within the
discipline. Thus, when a substantial group of legal scholars declares
doctrinal explanation inadequate because it cannot explain the value
choices made within the legal regime, that declaration is, in a sense,
self-justifying, since the scholars are declaring that the goal of their
discipline is the study of value choices, but that these value choices
cannot be explained by indeterminate doctrine. While the assertion
that every case can be argued both ways may be challenged as a mat
ter of fact, the assertion of the goal of legal explanation cannot. The
very fact that a goal is asserted by those within the discipline makes it,
in some sense, the goal of legal explanation.
Of course, it is possible for members of a discipline to disagree
over its goals. For example, opponents of Critical theory might claim
that the "true" goal of legal explanation is the prediction or categori
zation of the actions of appellate judges and not the explanation of
value choices. But, as Collingwood and Kuhn point out, the only way
to determine that issue is to look at what those engaged in the study
consider to be the goals of their discipline. When the consensus splits,
it may lead to a new consensus arising from debate over the funda
mental goals of the discipline, or to development of a new discipline.
In either event, the very existence of the Critical Legal Studies move
ment establishes, in a sense, its critique of the adequacy of doctrinal
explanation.
As to the second central Critical assertion—that law (i.e., the
rule choices of decisionmakers) can only be adequately explained
through the political and social values implicit in such rule choices—
the problem of consensus becomes more acute. Most legal scholars
are likely to agree that at least one goal of legal study is to explain the
societal value choices of decisionmakers; yet, we have seen that expla
nations may take forms other than analyses of the structure of social
or political visions. One can analyze the social background or psy
chology of individuals or classes of decisionmakers;'' view law as rit" For example, Charles Grove Haines outlined a plan for a general study of the educa
tional background, family life, legal and political experience, and affiliations of Supreme Court
justices. Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic
Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 111. L. Rev. 96, 115-16 (1922). Haines' proposed
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ual or religion;'® or even, subject to all the caveats about
methodology, explain value choices on economic grounds." The
Critical theorist, in my view, does not assert that the implicit social
and political vision is the sole cause of legal decisions but merely a
necessary one. Thus, one may ask: What basis, if any, is there for
rejecting explanations based on other necessary causes?
I suggest that at this point the problem of legal explanation col
lapses into the broader problem of historical explanation. Historians
are faced constantly with the problem of overdetermination.*® Wars,
for example, may be attributed to the actions of kings and diplomats,
the operation of economic forces, various forms of class struggle, or
even demographic and geographic conditions. All of these may con
stitute valid historical explanations because they are all necessary con
ditions, without which particular wars would not have occurred as
they did. Similarly, the legal scholar, while recognizing the explana
tory power of societal structures of thought, must concede that there
are also many other conditions that explain why value choices in the
legal regime occur the way they do.
Does any basis, then, exist for asserting that such structures form
a better or more adequate ground for explaining such value choices?
The notion that such structures of thought are somehow more funda
mental than other modes of legal or historical explanation is an ap
pealing one since it can be plausibly argued that such structures
provide the very "language" within which such concepts as "judge"
and "law" acquire meaning.®' Yet such a claim is ultimately probstudy was discussed by Jerome Frank, who observed: "[S]uch investigations might prove of
immense value if they would stimulate judges to engage in searching self-analysis." Frank,
supra note 29, at 114.
'8 For example, Thurmond Arnold wrote:
The thing which we reverently call "Law" when we are talking about government
generally, and not predicting the results of particular lawsuits, can only be prop
erly described as an attitude ... a way of writing about human institutions in
terms of ideals . . . [that] meets a deep-seated popular demand that government
institutions symbolize a beautiful dream . . . .
T.W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government 33 (1935).
" See, e.g., Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 Hofstra
L. Rev. 553, 558-59 (1980); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487, 488 (1980).
^ For a general discussion of the Critical Legal theorists' interest in history, see Gordon,
supra note 1, at 57.
See, e.g.. Heller, supra note 2 at 177. Heller sets forth precisely this claim for the priority
of a structuralist model, as compared to other models, for explaining legal reasoning. Discuss
ing various theories of property rights based on sociobiology or Hobbesian philosophy. Heller
contends:
I do not believe that any of these accounts [of the origin of property rights]
can dispel the structural counterclaim that a cultural or linguistic system of dif-
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lematic. If these structures are truly fundamental, both the explana
tion and the explainer are similarly bound by their conceptual
categories and can make no special claim for the epistemological su
periority of this form of explanation." If the legal scholar tries to
preserve his privileged epistemological perspective by claiming that
these structures are bound by time and space and therefore may be
"seen whole" by some observers, the way is open for others to claim
priority for conditions which explain these structures in terms of indi
vidual psychology and class interest.^^
One way out of this dilemma is to move from a pure structuralist
position to a form of pragmatism that argues that some explanations
are more adequate because they are "fuller," within the context of the
discipline within which they are proposed. That is, they are better
explanations because they enable the historian to describe more of the
necessary conditions relevant to the occurrence of a given event. Such
a justification always involves a reference to the current state of
knowledge within the discipline. A social historian, for example, may
justify his explanation of the Puritan Revolution in terms of class con
flict by claiming that everybody (by which he means other historians)
already knows who Cromwell was and that the religious aspects of the
Revolution have already been fully explored. In this view of historical
explanation, examination of certain types of conditions are better sim
ply because they identify aspects of the causal background which have
not been previously examined and which, when added to the existing
analysis of causes of the Puritan Revolution, lead to a fuller and
therefore more "accurate" account. Robert Gordon seems to adopt a
variant of this position when he argues that there is "nothing wrong"
with a "functionalist" explanation of the enactment of a Wisconsin
ferentiations constitutes the concrete theory of the subject. However, a liberal so
cial order must reflect the bifurcated grammar that is expressed in classical
Western philosophical commitments. The dominant legal discourse must origi
nate in the twin representations of a knowable, objective . . . world and direct
subjective . . . apperceptions of norms originating only in individual volition.
Id.

Id. at 170-71. The problem could be rephrased in structuralist jargon as the delegitimation of the analyst, or in the more pungent lingo of some Critical scholars, the zapper gets
zapped. As Heller himself puts it; "One methodological problem within the logic of delegitimation concerns the position of the analyst: How does the analyst step outside his or her own
conceptual categories to evaluate determining structures, if one's categories themselves were
formed by these structures?" Id. at 170. These structural constraints on the analyst's percep
tions are, for Heller, the major problem of poststructuralist knowledge. See id. at 182-97; see
also Boyle, supra note 21, at 759 (phrasing the problem as a matter of how to distill "exper
iences that constitute [one] structure from those that contradict it," without making recourse to
an "infinite regress into meta-principles, meta-meta-principles, and so on").
" See e.g., Jacobson, Modem American Jurisprudence and the Problem of Power, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 713 (1985).
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lien law "as far as it goes."" But he then goes on to show that an
explanation in terms of the underlying political consciousness of the
lawmaker provides a fuller explanation of why that law, rather than
some other, was enacted and thus constitutes a better explanation."
This justification presupposes that an explanation of value choices is
part of the goal of the discipline of legal history, and that one explana
tion of a historical event is better than another if it enables historians
to set forth more of the historical causes of that event.
But goals of historical explanation may sometimes involve select
ing among necessary causes, rather than aggregating them. Histori
ans sometimes have bitter disputes about causes, even when the causal
explanations advanced by both sides describe different necessary con
ditions for the occurrence of the same event. William Dray points out
an example of such a dispute surrounding the causes of the American
Civil War." He observes that, while some historians blame the Civil
War on various acts of individuals, others ascribe it to conflicts over
issues like slavery and states' rights or to the blunders of contempo
rary politicians." Dray rightly notes that this type of dispute makes
no sense if the goal of historical explanation is simply to set forth the
fullest possible account of all the necessary conditions of the Civil
War. He argues that in this case, the goal of the historian is to make a
normative judgment. The debate over what "caused" the Civil War is
really a debate over who was responsible—that is, who was to
blame—for the outbreak of the Civil War."
Legal explanation, even more clearly than historical explanation,
partakes of this normative character. We "explain" the Parol Evi
dence Rule in terms which normatively justify it (i.e., "it prevents
fraud" or "it leads to greater certainty among contracting parties as to
their obligations"). Such justifications, as we have seen, presuppose
their own societal and political structures and a set of values inherent
in such structures. The legal scholar who explains the law in terms of
^ Gordon, supra note 1, at 110-11.
65 Id. at 111.
66 Dray, Some Causal Accounts of the American Civil War, 91 Daedalus 578, 579 (1962).
Dray states: "[T]he very concept of causation employed by historians is such that no attempt
at mere 'fairness,' or increase of mere 'information,' would guarantee agreement by investiga
tors with different standards of value. . . . [T]he concepts of value and of historical causation
are not logically separable." Id.
67 Id. at 580-87.
66 Id. at 587. Dray argues that causal conclusions in history are logically dependent on
moral values: "As long as 'cause' is not to mean 'sufficient condition,' there must be some
reason for singling out one relevant condition of what happened from the others. In the cases
we have examined, at least, the historian's reason appears to derive from moral considera
tions." Id.
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those structures reveals the value system implicit in that structure and
permits it to be evaluated in terms of the (possibly diflFerent) values of
the person seeking the explanation. Thus, the adequacy of the expla
nation of law through social structures of thought is justified by a
redefinition of the goals of legal scholarship. If the goal of explaining
a legal rule is to enable the one seeking the explanation to make a
normative judgment about the rule, then the explanation must be in
terms that reveal the implicit normative structures embodied in the
rule. Such scholars seek to understand rules in a different way from
those who simply seek to understand why an individual judge decided
a case the way she did, or whether she will decide a similar case the
same way.
This view of legal scholarship is analogous to the vision of some
philosophers of history who recognize that the enterprise of history is
in some sense contradictory: historians seek to provide an account of
historical events, including the social and political structures of
thought in which the historical actors understood those events, yet
must do so in terms of the perspectives, the structures of thought, of
their own time.^' Yet this same contradiction may also be seen as a
healthy tension, a means of discovering the differences that make
judgments, including normative judgments, possible. For example, it
would be impossible to study the American law of slavery without
invoking the contemporary historian's own normative perspective;^"
indeed, that perspective will have much to do with what questions the
historian chooses to ask and what aspects of the law he chooses to
study." Yet the historian will be unable to answer those questions if
he does not attempt and to some degree succeed in his effort to re
create the social and political structures of thought, including the nor
mative aspects of thought implicit in those legal rules. For example,
the ability to understand and make judgments about the law of slav
ery exists in the tensions or contradictions between those diflFerent
normative structures.'^
While this view of history is surely not "objective" in that it deSee R. Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History 308-09 (G. Irwin trans. 1961).
All historical descriptions, Aron says, consist of "taking in the whole from a certain point of
view." Id. at 308. He continues: "As long as the plurality of [historical descriptions] persists
... the truth of any one of them can be proved only by supra-historical arguments, by the
values which each one incarnates or the future it announces." Id. at 309.
'o See Tushnet, A Comment on the Critical Method in Legal History, 6 Cardozo L. Rev.
101 (1985). (explaining the decisions of antebellum southern judges with reference to their
underlying social visions, a methodolgy influenced by the author's own structuralist
jurisprudence).
R. Cover, Justice Accused 1-7 (1975).
72 Id.
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nies the possibility of a universal historical truth, it is far from purely
relativist in that it assumes an ability to transcend existing structures
of thought or at least perceive alternative structures. The ability to
perceive alternative structures is, of course, also a central feature of
Critical thought; without it the very notion of an explanation in terms
of underlying structures of thought would be impossible." In much
the same way that explanations of historical events seek to bridge the
gap between contemporary and historical conceptual frameworks,
these explanations of law seek to bridge the gap between the norma
tive framework of the rule and the normative framework of those
seeking the explanation. Thus, these explanations can be evaluated
only by their ability to illuminate, and therefore advance, the
enterprise.
73 For example, in the work of Roberto Unger, perception of alternative structures is nwessary to Critical thought in two senses: "On the one hand, there are practical and imaginative
structures that help shape ordinary political and economic activity .... On the other hand,
however, no higher-level order governs the history of these structures or determines their pos
sible identities and limits." Unger, supra note 1, at 665. In other words, knowledge of alterna
tive structures of thought helps us to understand the frozen, limited nature of other past and
present social organizations, and at the same time helps us to anticipate a truly alternative
structure emerging from that critical understanding.
Unger further states:
[The Critical method] interpret[s] the formative institutional and imaginative con
texts of social life as frozen politics, traces each of their elements to the particular
history and measure of constraint upon transformative conflict that the element
represents. This method must wage perpetual war against the tendency to take the
workings of a particular social world as if they defined the limits of the real and the
possible in social life.
Id. Robert Gordon makes a similar point: "The hope of getting out of that trap and of explor
ing the alternatives is what fuels the enterprise of criticizing the dominant vision." Gordon,
supra note 1, at 71.

